## 1st Off

#### OUR INTERPRETATION: The resolution asks a yes/no question as to the desirability of the United States Federal Government action. The role of the ballot should be to affirm or reject the actions and outcomes of the plan.

#### 1. THE TOPIC IS DEFINED BY THE PHRASE FOLLOWING THE COLON – THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE AGENT OF THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL DEBATERS

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2K

 <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### 2. “RESOLVED” EXPRESSES INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary 2K

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### 3. “SHOULD” DENOTES AN EXPECTATION OF ENACTING A PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary – 2K

[www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### 4. THE U.S.F.G. is the three branches of government

Dictionary.com 2k6 [[http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united+states+government](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united%2Bstates%2Bgovernment)]

|  |
| --- |
| Noun |
| the executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of the United States  |

#### Decisionmaking skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics

Hager, Bryn Mawr College political science professor, ‘92

[Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70, accessed 10-7-12, AFB]

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### Limits outweighs: Need a balance between predictability and creativity—debatinf within a common framework enhances education because it maximizes elaboration and testing of ideasGoodin 03

[Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, uwyo//amp]

Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and procedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue.

#### Switch side debate good-engagement with identities we do not identify with is critical to overcoming resentment-

Glover 10

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

In this vein, Connolly sees the goal of political engagement as securing a positive ‘ethos of engagement’ in relation to popular movements which alter existing assumptions, that is, a positive attitude towards attempts at pluralization. Connolly suggests we do so through thecultivation of two essential virtues: agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. 88 Agonisticrespect is defined as a situation whereby each political actor arrives at an appreciation for the factthat their own self-definition is bound with that of others, as well as recognition of the degree towhich each of these projections is profoundly contestable. 89 While Connolly notes that agonistic respect is a ‘kissing cousin’ of liberal tolerance, he distinguishes it by saying that the latter typically carries ‘the onus of being at the mercy of a putative majority that often construes itsown position to be beyond question.’ 90 Thus, agonistic respect is a reciprocal democratic virtue meant to operate across relations of difference, and Connolly deploys it as a regulative ideal forthe creation agonistic democratic spaces. 91 In a somewhat related way, the virtue of ‘critical responsiveness’ also attempts to move beyond liberal tolerance. 92 Critical responsiveness entails ‘ careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.’ 93 Critical responsiveness is not pity, charity, or paternalism but implies anenhanced degree of concern for others, driven by the cultivation of reciprocal empathic concern 21 for that which you are not. 94 This attitude cannot be developed in an abstract relation to thesenew and existing forms of radical cultural, political, religious, and philosophical difference.Critical responsiveness above all requires that one ‘get[s] a whiff of experiences heretofore aliento [us]’, recognizing that while this may be unsettling or cause discomfort, direct engagement isthe means by which you, ‘work tactically on yourself and others to overcome existential resentment of this persistent condition of human being.’

## 2nd Off

#### Dilluting the conception of gender to construction lapses into establishing symmetry between the sexes where symmetry never existed- erases the violence of patriarchal history

Braidotti 2011

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

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A third related phenomenon in this respect is the recent emergence in the international debate of Italian, Australian, Dutch, and other strains of feminist thought as an alternative that helps split the comfortably binary opposition between French Continental and Anglo-American positions (Bono and Kemp 1991, 1993; Hermsen and Lemming 1991). To these we should add the wealth of non-European traditions, notably the Asian women’s studies community as well as pan-African feminism (Amina Mama). 1 These different traditions and their respective publications havecontributed not only to putting other, however “minor,” feminist cultures on the map but also to stressing the extent to which the notion of gender is a vicissitude of the English language that bears little or no relevance to theoretical traditions in non-European and Romance European languages (de Lauretis 1988:3– 37). As such, gender has found no successful echo in the French, Spanish, or Italian feminist movements. If you think that, in French, le genre can be used to refer to humanity as a whole (le genre humain) you will get an idea of the culture-specific nature of the term and its untranslatability. This also means that the sex/gender distinction, which is one of the pillars on which English-speaking feminist theory is built, makes neither epistemological nor political sense in many non-English, Western European contexts, where the notions of sexuality and sexual difference are currently used instead. Although much ink has been spilled to either praise or attack theories of sexual difference, little effort has been made to try and situate the debates in their cultural contexts. Nor has there been sufficient attention paid to the nationalistic undertones that often mark the discussions around sexual difference as opposed to gender theories. The fourth and final remark I would like to make about gender concerns the institutional practice to which it gives rise, which I find problematic for feminists. The scientific-sounding term gender appears to strike a more reassuring note in the academic world than the more explicitly political feminist studies. This factor is partly responsible for the success encountered by “gender studies” in universities and publishing houses of late. In my opinion, this success has resulted in a shift of focus away from the feminist agenda toward a more generalized attention being paid to the social construction of differences between the sexes. It is a broadening out which is also a thinning down of the political agenda; this is painfully obvious in policy-making practice. Arguing that men have a gender too, many institutions started claiming the establishment of “men’s studies” courses as a counterpart to, or, alternatively, as a structural component of, women’s studies. Masculinity comes back in, under the cover of “gender.” Although male critiques of masculinity are extremely important and necessary, I think this institutional competition between the broadening out of “gender studies”—to include men as a presence and as a topic, on the one hand— and the practical feminist agenda is regrettable. This situation has caused some feminists to view “gender” and “gender mainstreaming” with suspicion at the level of institutional practice. On a more theoretical level I think that the main assumption behind “gender studies” is of a new symmetry between the sexes on the ground of their social constructivist structure, which practically results in a renewal of interest for men, masculinity, and men’s studies. Faced with this, I would like to state my open disagreement with this illusion of symmetry and instead revindicate sexual difference as a powerful factor of asymmetry. Moreover, I think that the historical texts of the feminist debate on gender do not lend themselves to a case for sexual symmetry. Within a perspective of the historiography of feminist ideas, I would define gender as a notion that defines multiple social relations. It offers a set of frameworks within which feminist theory has explained the social and discursive construction and representation of differences between the sexes. As such, gender, in feminist theory, primarily fulfills the function of challenging the universalist tendency of critical language and systems of knowledge as well as scientific discourse at large.

#### Queering sexuality through the politics of eroticism reifies advanced capitalism and simply plays into the commodification of bodies and pleasure that capitalism desires

Braidotti 2011

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

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The real reason for my relative silence on the issue of sexuality is theoretical, of course: I do not believe that sexuality is the key to identity, not to mention the fact that I am extremely critical of the institution of identity as a whole. I am a first-generation poststructuralist in that I find the emphasis on sexuality to be one of the most dominant forms of marketing steady and functional identities in our culture. You would have to be blind not to see that sexual “truth” and erotic “authenticities” are everywhere in our world, in mainstream as in countercultures. On this score, I do not see any significant difference between Desperate Housewives and The L Word: both produce, inflate, and profit from the emphasis on the quest for true identities and the promise of sexual fulfillment. For me this is part of the generalized commodification of sexualities in our culture. Andrijasevic: You of all people, however, know how important representation is. Don’t you think that the representation of lesbian and gay sex— such as in The L Word and Ang Lee’s Brokeback Mountain— might be of importance in recognizing “other” sexualities and in furthering the rights of queer people? Braidotti: Yes, of course— and I am certainly not against popular culture— but if we start on this topic, then we need to reopen discussion on lots of unspoken things. Porn, for instance— let’s pronounce the word. The generalized, soft version of porn that our entertainment industry provides, which many of us enjoy to different degrees, is a mode of addiction that keeps us— the poor, sexually deprived masses— hanging in there for more. In The L Word there is some pretty hot sex. It is lovely, but it is formatted in a way that suits the glossy magazine vision of lipstick lesbians with perfect bodies and healthy bank accounts. I know, this is the stuff romance and fantasy life is made of, but we should call it by its name and enjoy it for what it is, without pretending that any of this has any radical power or subversive charge. As a matter of fact, it is about as radical as an after-dinner mint! We are simply more partial to it because it functions under the label of an identity they taught us to despise— the “L word,” precisely— and which is now being rebranded as glamorous for us. I rejoice in the positive re-branding operation, but I am also fully aware that this takes place within a consumerist model of identity politics that fits in well and is supported by advanced capitalism. For me, both Brokeback Mountain and The L Word are good examples of how nondangerous identity politics has become. You just get an alternative cultural package that confirms the niche of the market you have come to represent. Queer activists should boycott this neoliberal consumerist approach of identity a priori. Race activists have done this already: Paul Gilroy, in his analysis of the marketing of the male athletic body— Tiger Woods, Michael Jordan, etc.—argues that the black body is now glamorized and commodified, but this doesn’t mean that racism is over. I think we are falling into the lure of taking, as liberation, advanced capitalism’s smart recuperation of our own political and personal desire. The term sexual liberation is an oxymoron— there is no liberation through sexuality, at least not in our advanced capitalist system where identities turn into commodified products repackaged as acts of self-expression and liberation. There is no transgression in this system— only successive layers of integration and assimilation into a profit-making machine. We need more self-reflexivity on this issue: queer does not automatically equate with subversive. On the contrary, at times I think that it is a flattening out of sexuality into one specific kind of sex-indexed practice that supports individualism. Andrijasevic: What is your position on sexual identities, then? Braidotti: I just don’t believe that sexuality should be confirmed and upheld by radical movements as the pillar of counteridentity claims. I think that if we are queering sexuality, we need new mapping on the nomadic organization of our pleasures and desires. This includes new modes of accountability and of speaking about one’s own experiences. The times when “speaking out” was a subversive model of public intervention are truly over: in our culture the media industry is all about filling the public sphere with accounts of private experiences. I think we need to shift the emphasis from sex alone and look at sexuality in all its complexity. For me sexuality is about relations and relationality in many, multiple ways, which explode identity into a web of relations, encounters, and connections. Sexuality is intense curiosity, openness, carnal intelligence. It is an affirmative force, though not deprived of destructive edges and ripples of its own making. It only makes sense to me as a site of experimentation, risk taking, which I insist on combining with ethical accountability and care. I guess it is a sort of balancing act between the intensity of longing, the need for accountability, and my attraction to complexity.

#### The alternative is to affirm the female-embodied subject.

Braidotti 2011

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

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Whenever I fail to forget the continuing patterns of marginalization of women, I simply “forget to forget,” which does not mean that I fall into a stupor, but rather that I am zigzagging across different time sequences. Forgetting to forget the imperative of one-way time travel, I inhabit my critical consciousness as a time machine, which allows me to travel across different realities or spatiotemporal coordinates. Being a critical female subject, inscribed asymmetrically into the power relations of advanced capitalism, splits me temporarily. Attempting to reconcile the pieces would be madness: better to settle into the everyday schizophrenia of late postmodernity, also known as early global technoculture. I call this a form of active resistance, understood as a strategy to deal with the typical of schizophrenia of our times. Schizophrenia means the co-occurrence of internally contradictory and even incompatible trends and time zones. And the status of women is a powerful indicator of these. These are historic times that see the return of the most primitive forms of naturalization in the status of women alongside high technological celebration of the death of the naturalized order— times when geopolitical wars are being justified in the light of the backward status of women in non-Christian cultures. More than ever, sexual difference is exacerbated and polarized. Gender roles and stereotypes, far from being effaced, are strengthened in the new world order that followed the events of September 11, 2001. Hence the status of women is both central to and paradoxically multiplied across the social and political agenda. In such a context, the feminist awareness of internal discrepancies, or differences within the subject, becomes quite a vantage viewpoint. Feminist reappropriations of feminine specificity strike a dissonant note 110 Sexual Difference Theory in this framework, marking forms of political resistance: a multiplicity of possible strategies, internally contradictory, paradoxical and nonlinear. They may not be one united party, but a kind of a kaleidoscope of maybe potentially contradictory strategies. An Irigarayan approach stressed the complex and nonunitary nature of the subject without making concessions to either relativism or to amoral undecidability. Irigaray instead stresses the accountable structure of an embodied and hence sexualized subject whose sheer bodily materiality constitutes both the site of empowerment and transformation as well as the marker of limits and hence of boundaries. Irigaray’s feminism affirms political and ethical passions. It designs tools and road maps by which to establish values, not in the normative mode, but in the sense of an evaluation of interactions with a large variety of others, including external objects and projects. This “intensive” reading of feminist theory expresses a nonunitary— in my terms, nomadic— subject that is opposed to classical humanism, or liberal notions of the individual, but also to facile postmodern celebrations of fragmentation for its own sake. In opposition to the urge to complete the loss of specification, or marking of the subject, this position expresses also my desire to defend the relevance of that historically obsolete institution known as the “feminine.” As I suggested earlier, it is neither as an essentialized entity nor as an immediately accessible one; femininity is rather a virtual reality, in the sense that it is the effect of a political and conceptual project aimed at transcending the traditional subject position of Woman as other. This transcendence, however, occurs through the flesh, in enfleshed locations and not in flight away from the body. Feminism, like all critical theories, can express affirmative forces and thus liberate in those who partake of it a yearning for freedom, dignity, justice, lightness, and joyfulness. These values can also be translated both into dogmatic gloom and into more constructive rational beliefs and policies. They form, in any case, a substratum of affect that activates the movement in the first place. In feminism, as elsewhere in critical theory and practice, the wager is to move beyond the negative stasis and the slave morality of an oppositional culture. One must avoid the deadly serious priestly revolutionary zeal of dogma and doxa joining forces within the gravitational pull of a new normative order. If politics begin with our passions, then what I yearn for is the gay knowledge of an affirmative critical spirit.

#### Escaping from the embodied subject justifies bare life and extermination

Braidotti 2011

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The blurring of sexual difference as well as the powerful social trend toward androgynous, unisexed, grotesque, gothic, transsex, cyborg, and monstrous bodies reveals the transformations that have occurred in the contemporary sexual imaginary. With them, the linearity generational time is also arrested, dislocated, and challenged. “Organs without bodies” as our historical condition introduces multiple and internally contradictory temporalities within the embodied subject. Thus, “age” and “the aging process” disappears into broader and less defined categories: the “third age,” as opposed to the “teen”-age express a cultural obsession with perennial youth and the denial of aging. The same blurring of intergenerational distinctions occurs in spatial terms: take the contemporary relationship to food, for instance. The fast-food inhabitants of the modern metropolis have collapsed time in anticipating dreams of artificial nutrition: frozen food, precooked food, mashed-up food, and all kinds of food replacements, mostly pills. No time for cooking: the acceleration, but also contraction of the spatiotemporal coordinates enacts the dematerialization of the actual matter that used to be food. Pill popping emerges then as a cultural imperative, as if the shrinking stomachs of the collectively anorexic city dwellers— variations on the theme of the bachelor machines (Penley 1985)—ignored all hunger, despite the increasing visibility of poverty all around them (Lipovetsky 1983). And yet the expanding girth of most inhabitants of the advanced world points to the opposite reaction: obesity as the social assertion of forms of resistance to the dematerialization of the body in contemporary society. Pill popping, better to evacuate the body, to simplify the bodily functions. The new RU486— the abortion pill— replaced the contested gesture of surgical intervention by a perfectly trivial one: the body is not, or, at least, it is not one. Dif ferent degrees of bodily dematerialization are proliferating around us. Not even modern warfare really takes the body seriously, i.e., as a politically concrete variable, military geopolitical considerations are mere logistical operations (Virilio 1976);. It is no longer a question of inflicting death, but of servicing strategic targets with a minimum of collateral damage. Paradoxically enough, it is still a matter of extermination, but not of individuals as much as of masses. It is less a question of killing (Foucault 1976) than of allowing some to stay alive. The highly televised and dramatic coverage of the Desert Storm operation against Iraq in the 1990s and, later, the spectacularly indecent photographs from the Abu Ghraib U.S. military prison during the second Iraq war have highlighted the main point that concern me here. The first is the primacy of visualization techniques; the occultation of the physical body from the field of political and especially military action (more on this in chapter 7). The second is the evanescence of bodily matter and hence also of corpses, especially in the utter disregard shown by Western media for non-Western casualties. The latter are reduced to the nonhuman status that Giorgio Agamben describes as “bare life” (Agamben 1998). Life is an “added” factor that needs to be managed and allocated according to a clear hierarchical scale of entitlement, while death is that from whence one can really measure power and/in the body. The horizon of mortality as the primary justification for biopolitical power includes the notion of warfare as a legitimate instrument. Foucault emphasizes the extent to which political philosophy takes mortality and the power to induce death as the defining feature of sovereignty. This necropolitical element— the management of death— lies paradoxically at the core of biopolitics— the management of life. One does not act without the other. I shall return to this paradox in the next chapter.

## 3rd Off

#### The aff advocacy is a project set against the Heterosexist assumptions that directly contribute to the project to exterminate kuaer life.

#### Their focus on queer eroticism is blind to intersections of gender and racial oppression- this monolithic understanding papers over violence against raced and gendered bodies.

Lee ‘3

Wenshu Lee, PhD Kuaering Queer Theory: My Autocritography and a Race-Conscious, Womanist, Transnational Turn in Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the Discipline(s) edited by Gust A. Yep, Karen Lovaas, John P. Elia. (147-167) 2003

Queer theory25 and the gay liberation movement have increased the visibility of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders in the United States. However, black womanists and radical women of color have articulated and challenged a fundamental elision–sexual minorities who are not white, male, and affluent remain relatively invisible in their different localities. Barbara Smith, a long time organizer and cofounder of Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, confronts this elision and the practical impact it has on grassroots political activity: In most cases counter campaigns against the right are led by white gays and lesbians who have little idea how to communicate with and work effectively with members of the Black community. The racism, white solipsism, and elitism that traditionally dominate the mainstream white gay male political agenda spell absolute disaster when what is at stake is changing our own communities’ attitudes about issues of sexual orientation and civil rights. (1995/2000, p. 173) This is not merely a local/national problem. It is inscribed in and produced through “theory”: I am particularly struck by the fact that for the most part queer theory and queer politics, which are currently so popular, offer neither substantial antiracist analysis nor practice.26 (1999, p. 18) Forging coalition politics and building communities among people who exist “as women, as people of color, and as queer,” Vera Miao remarks: Narratives of rejection and disillusionment by many Asian American lesbians and bisexual women, whose exclusion is caused by the homophobia of racial and ethnic communities and the racism of predominantly white queer populations, are only a few painful interventions in prevailing definitions of “home” and “community.” (1998, p. 70) Addressing the same problem in *Text & Performance Quarterly*, one of the leading journals in Communication Studies, E. Patrick Johnson (2001) recently offered “quare studies,” an invention that dreams of the forgotten localities inhabited by shadowy figures–black, poor, male and female–multiply erased in the incubating but hegemonic queer hierarchies. Quare studies, according to Johnson, addresses what is left out27 in queer theory: While queer theory has opened up new possibilities for theorizing gender and sexuality, like a pot of gumbo cooked too quickly, it has failed to live up to its full critical potential by refusing to accommodate all the queer ingredients contained inside its theoretical pot. (2001, p. 18) Johnson, in other words, offers quare theory to redress the omissions of queer theory, featuring the specificities of gays and lesbians of color. His invention emphasizes race and class as interrelated dimensions of sexuality. It pays attention to communities, embodied performativity, and theory in the flesh, taking an interventionist stance in performing critical praxis.

I fully embrace Johnson’s move from *queer* to *quare.* Here is a theory that is not merely brilliant but timely and useful. Yet to understand the discursive amnesia in nu nu connections in Taiwan and to push theorizing’s critical potential, I cannot but move further into transnational womanist quare studies. My rearticulation is “womanist” because I insist on noting gendered and racialized experiences in specific localities, honoring the black women and radical women of color who have taught me many important lessons.28 My rearticulation is “quare” because, like Johnson, I can no longer stomach the naturalized presence of homophobia in heteronormative communities or whiteness in queer communities. Finally, my rearticulation is also “transnational” because I live in an increasingly globalized world that is desperately in need of critical praxis (Hegde, 1998; Shome, 1996, 1999) beyond the reach of International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization; and I resist the technologies of global domination on the Third World, wittingly or unwittingly exercised by progressive First World identity academicians, be they feminists, anti-racists, poststructuralists, Marxists, or queer theorists (Kaplan & Grewal, 1994). In sum, my critical rearticulation29 speaks to the importance of quare theory and quare coalition politics, making a transnational link between and beyond Taiwanese quare wo/men and radical quare wo/men in the United States.

#### Vote negative to kuare the 1ac

#### That solves and avoid the impact- Kuaer is a subversive word play that combines notions of energy, play, and movement to create more critical assessment of queer theory.

Lee ‘3

Wenshu Lee, PhD Kuaering Queer Theory: My Autocritography and a Race-Conscious, Womanist, Transnational Turn in Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the Discipline(s) edited by Gust A. Yep, Karen Lovaas, John P. Elia. (147-167) 2003

Resonating with the sensibility of quare theory without fulminating against queer studies, I extend tongzhi and kuer further into kuaer, transnational womanist quare/s, a starting point for subversive strategy as wordplay. Kuaer is a transliteration of two Chinese characters kua and er. *Er* literally means child/children. Elsewhere I defined it: “. . . the function of *Er* is like the y added to a person’s name in English, for example, Jimmy, Jenny, Tommy. It makes one sound childlike” (Lee, 1999, p. 297). Rather than being childish, er connotes vibrant energy, the ability to grow and to learn new things, and is consistent with the move to originality and away from the banal. Kua lends itself to multiple meanings. Depending on its tonal differentiations, Kua may mean crossing, praised or proud/boastful. Together, Kuaer has many shades and colors: Children who cross horizons*. Children who are praised. Children who are proud/boastful.* Children who cross worlds and understand quare and womanist politics*. Transnational womanist quare children who are proud and praised and whose critical consciousness is multi-racial, multi-sexual, multi-gendered, and multi-class-based.* Kuaering queer theory, my move to a transnational womanist quare theory and politics affords me a more critical assessment of the Chinese nu nu world, from *zi shu nu* and *bu luo jia* to *kuer*, *nu tong zhi*, and *lazi*. One of the main differences between the 19th century and the 1990s *nu nu* worlds lies in whether reform is explicit or not. Topley comments on marriage resistance practice as “nonorthodox but nonreformist” (1975, 68). The *nu tongzhi* movement, on the other hand, is consciously reformist, asking for equal rights in marriage, family, employment and personal relationships. The former embraced an ambiguous “celibacy,” while the latter champions unambiguous “sexual pleasure.”

## 4th Off

#### The affirmative’s attachment to the historical injury of heterosettlerism is not an epistemology but rather an effect of the crisis of the modern subject- their inability to unburden themselves from the trauma of the past guarantees they either loathe life or hunt down scape-goats- either turns case

Brown 93

[Wendy, “Wounded Attachments”, Political Theory, p. http://www.jstor.org/stable/191795 .Accessed: 25/03/2013 11:13Your //wyo-tjc]

Premising itself on the natural equality of human beings, liberalism makes a political promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality or achieve a civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature. It is the tension between the promises of individualistic liberty and the requisites of equality that yields ressentiment in one of two directions, depending on how the paradox is brokered. A strong commitment to freedom vitiates the fulfillment of the equality promise and breeds ressentiment as welfare-state liberalism-attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the "disadvantaged." Conversely, a strong com- mitment to equality, requiring heavy state interventionism and economic redistribution, attenuates the commitment to freedom and breeds ressentiment expressed as neoconservative antistatism, racism, charges of reverse racism, and so forth. However, it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their situatedness within power, their production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness and production that casts the liberal subject into failure, the failure to make itself in the context of a discourse in which its self-making is assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche calls suffering, must find either a reason within itself (which redoubles the failure) or a site of external blame on which to avenge its hurt and redistribute its pain. Here is Nietzsche's account of this moment in the production of ressentiment: For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering-in short, some living thing upon which he can on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy.... This ... constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengeful- ness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects. .. to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.'8 Ressentiment in this context is a triple achievement: it produces an affect (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt, it produces a culprit respon- sible for the hurt, and it produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche's terms, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise "unendurable. Now, what I want to suggest is that in a culture already streaked with the pathos of ressentiment for these reasons, there are several characteristics of late modem postindustrial societies that accelerate and expand the conditions of its production. My listing is necessarily highly schematic. First, the phenomenon that William Connolly names "increased global contingency" combines with the expanding pervasiveness and complexity of domination by capital and bureaucratic state and social networks to create an unparalleled individual powerlessness over the fate and direction of one's own life, intensifying the experiences of impotence, dependence, and gratitude inher- ent in liberal capitalist orders and consitutive of ressentiment.'9 Second, the steady desacralization of all regions of life-what Weber called disenchan- ment, what Nietzsche called the death of God-would appear to add yet another reversal to Nietzsche's genealogy of ressentiment as perpetually available to "alternation of direction." In Nietzsche's account, the ascetic priest deployed notions of "guilt, sin, sinfulness, depravity and damnation" to "direct the ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back upon themselves ... and in this way [exploited] the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance, and self-overcoming."20 However, the desacralizing tendencies of late modernity undermine the efficacy of this deployment and turn suffering's need for exculpation back toward a site of external agency. Third, the increased fragmentation, if not disintegration, of all forms of association until recently not organized by the commodities market-communities, churches, families-and the ubiqui- tousness of the classificatory, individuating schemes of disciplinary society combine to produce an utterly unrelieved individual, one without insulation from the inevitable failure entailed in liberalism's individualistic construc- tion. In short, the characteristics of late modern secular society, in which individuals are buffeted and controlled by global configurations of disciplin- ary and capitalist power of extraordinary proportions, and are at the same time nakedly individuated, stripped of reprieve from relentless exposure and accountability for themselves, together add up to an incitement to ressenti- ment that might have stunned even the finest philosopher of its occasions and logics. Starkly accountable, yet dramatically impotent, the late modern liberal subject quite literally seethes with ressentiment. Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and "reaction" to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning that Nietzsche ascribed to it, namely, as an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in "reaction"-the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds-and not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought, Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is a reaction to something outside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures.21 If ressentiment's "cause" is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the "imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds."22 This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does"23 (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege" as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery."24 But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressenti- ment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This invest- ment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recogni- tion predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfac- tions of revenge that ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alter- nately denies the very possibility of these things or blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverses without subverting this blaming structure: it does not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal indi- vidualism presupposes nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile extemal world."2 Insofar as what Nietzsche calls slave morality produces identity in reac- tion to power, insofar as identity rooted in this reaction achieves its moral superiority by reproaching power and action themselves as evil, identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproach of power as such. Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impo- tence in the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political ~~paralysis~~, to feast on generalized political impotence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation. Indeed it is more likely to punish and reproach-"punishment is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical lie it creates a good conscience for itself'-than to find venues of self-affirming action.2

\*we do not endorse ableist or gendered language

#### We should forget the 1ac in order to affirm life- [green]

Zupancic, 2003 (Alenka, Philosopher, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzche’s philosophy of the two” Online, MB)

It is true that there is also a rather different notion present in Christianity, a notion much closer to Nietzsche’s own position—namely, the notion of mercy as situated “beyond law” (Jenseits des Rechts). Nietzsche links to this notion nothing less than the possibility of an escape from the vicious circle of punishment and guilt. But his notion of mercy is not simply that of an act of forgiveness; it can spring only from a surplus of “power” and “richness.” Illustrating this with the example of actual wealth, Nietzsche writes that the creditor becomes more human to the extent that he has grown richer: so that, finally, how much injury he can endure without suffering from it becomes the actual measure of his wealth.24 Such a creditor can now allow himself the noblest luxury possible: letting those who harm him go unpunished. In this way, the justice which began with “everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged” ends by winking, and letting those who are incapable of discharging their debt go free. This “self-overcoming of justice” is called mercy, and remains the privilege of the most “powerful.”25 We should be careful here not to believe that the terms “rich” and “powerful” refer simply to those who have a lot of money, and hold this or that position of power.As Nietzsche points out, it is the capacity not to be injured, and not to suffer because of an injustice, that constitutes the measure of one’s richness and power—not the capacity to endure suffering and injury, to bear pain, but the capacity not to let this suffering as suffering enter the constitution of one’s subjectivity (which also means the capacity not to let oneself be subjectivized in the figure of the “subject of injury,” the figure of the victim). Those who can manage this are “rich” and “powerful” because they can manage it, not the other way around. There is also an important difference between forgiving and (what Nietzsche calls) forgetting. Forgiveness has a perverse way of involving us even further in debt. To forgive somehow always implies to pay for the other, and thus to use the very occurrence of injury and its forgiveness as a new “engagement ring.” Nietzsche makes this very point in relation to Christianity: the way God has forgiven our sins has been to pay for them, to pay for them with His own “flesh.” This is the fundamental perversity of Christianity: while forgiving, it simultaneously brandishes at us the cross, the instrument of torture, the memory of the one who suffered and died so that we could be forgiven, the memory of the one who paid for us. Christianity forgives, but does not forget. One could say that, with the eyes of the sinner fixed on the cross, forgiving creates a new debt in the very process of this act. It forgives what was done, but it does not forgive the act of forgiving itself. On the contrary, the latter establishes a new bond and a new debt. It is now infinite mercy (as the capacity of forgiving) that sustains the infinite debt, the debt as infinite. The debt is no longer brought about by our actions; it is brought about by the act of forgiving us these actions.We are indebted for forgiveness. The infinite capacity to forgive might well become the infernal flame in which we “temper” our debt and guilt. This is why Nietzsche counters the concept of forgiving with the concept of forgetting (“a good example of this in modern times is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done to him and was unable to forgive simply because he—forgot”).26 This is perhaps the moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean “forgetting” is actually about. What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of “great health”? Nietzsche claims that memory entertains some essential relationship with pain. This is what he describes as the principle used in human “mnemotechnics”: “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory.”27 Thus, if memory is essentially related to pain (here it seems that Nietzsche claims the opposite of what psychoanalysis is claiming: that traumatic events are the privileged objects of repression; yet pain is not the same thing as trauma, just as “forgetting” is not the same thing as repressing), then forgetting refers above all to the capacity not to nurture pain. This also means the capacity not to make pain the determining ground of our actions and choices. What exactly is pain (not so much physical pain, but, rather, the “mental pain” that can haunt our lives)? It is a way in which the subject internalizes and appropriates some traumatic experience as her own bitter treasure. In other words, in relation to the traumatic event, pain is not exactly a part of this event, but already its memory (the “memory of the body”). And Nietzschean oblivion is not so much an effacement of the traumatic encounter as a preservation of its external character, of its foreignness, of its otherness. In Unfashionable Observations, Second Piece (“On the Utility and Liability of History for Life”), Nietzsche links the question of forgetting (which he employs as a synonym for the ahistorical) to the question of the act. Forgetting, oblivion, is the very condition of possibility for an act in the strong sense of the word. Memory (the “historical”) is eternal sleeplessness and alert insomnia, a state in which no great thing can happen, and which could even be said to serve this very purpose. Considering the common conception according to which memory is something monumental that “fixes” certain events, and closes us within their horizon, Nietzsche proposes a significantly different notion. It is precisely as an eternal openness, an unceasing stream, that memory can immobilize us, mortify us, make us incapable of action. Nietzsche invites us to imagine the extreme example of a human being who does not possess the power to forget. Such a human being would be condemned to see becoming everywhere: he would no longer believe in his own being, would see everything flow apart in turbulent particles, and would lose himself in this stream of becoming. He would be like the true student of Heraclitus. A human being who wanted to experience things in a thoroughly historical manner would be like someone forced to go without sleep.28 Memory holds us in eternal motion—it keeps opening numerous horizons, and this is precisely how it i~~mmobilizes~~ us, forcing us into frenetic activity. Hence, Nietzsche advances a thesis that is as out of tune with our time as it was with his own: “every living thing can become healthy, strong and fruitful only within a defined horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself and too selfish, in turn, to enclose its own perspective within an alien horizon, then it will feebly waste away or hasten to its timely end.”29 Of course, Nietzsche’s aim here is not to preach narrow-mindedness and pettiness, nor is it simply to affirm the ahistorical against history and memory. On the contrary, he clearly states that it is only by thinking, reflecting, comparing, analyzing, and synthesizing (i.e. only by means of the power to utilize the past for life, and to reshape past events into history) that the human being becomes properly human.Yet, in the excess of history, the human being ceases to be human once again, no longer able to create or invent. This is why Nietzsche insists that “every great historical event” is born in the “ahistorical atmosphere,” that is to say, in conditions of oblivion and closure: Imagine a man seized and carried away by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea; how his world changes! Looking backward he feels he is blind, listening around he hears what is unfamiliar as a dull, insignificant sound; and those things that he perceives at all he never before perceived in this way; so palpable and near, colorful, resonant, illuminated, as though he were apprehending it with all his senses at once. All his valuations are changed and devalued; . . . It is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings; a tiny whirlpool of life in a dead sea of night and oblivion; and yet this condition—ahistorical, antihistorical through and through— is not only womb of the unjust deed, but of every just deed as well; and no artist will create a picture, no general win a victory, and no people gain its freedom without their having previously desired and striven to accomplish these deeds in just such an ahistorical condition. . . . Thus, everyone who acts loves his action infinitely more than it deserves to be loved, and the best deeds occur in such an exuberance of love that, no matter what, they must be unworthy of this love, even if their worth were otherwise incalculably great.30 If we read this passage carefully,we note that the point is not simply that the capacity to forget, or the “ahistorical condition,” is the condition of “great deeds” or “events.” On the contrary: it is the pure surplus of passion or love (for something) that brings about this closure of memory, this “ahistorical condition.” In other words, it is not that we have first to close ourselves within a defined horizon in order then to be able to accomplish something. The closure takes place with the very (“passionate”) opening toward something (“a woman or a great idea”). Nietzsche’s point is that if this surplus passion engages us “in the midst of life,” instead of mortifying us, it does so via its inducement of forgetting. Indeed, I could mention a quite common experience here: whenever something important happens to us and incites our passion,we tend to forget and dismiss the grudges and resentments we might have been nurturing before. Instead of “forgiving” those who might have injured us in the past, we forget and dismiss these injuries. If we do not, if we “work on our memory” and strive to keep these grudges alive, they will most probably affect and mortify our (new) passion.

\*we do not endorse ableist or gendered language

## Case

#### The aff creates a monolithic edifice of the Mormon church- this attitude of disgust and revulsion at what they don’t understand is the same logic of violence that drives queer bodies to hate themselves and consider suicide

Baldwin, 2007

[J. Tyler, Queer Mormons: Stuck between a rock and a hard place, http://www.pridedepot.com/?p=738250] /Wyo-MB

Suicide attempts by gay Mormons are not at all uncommon, according to a recent online survey conducted by Affirmation.org. The organization, with 33 chapters worldwide, is one of only a handful of groups dedicated to providing “a supportive environment for relieving the needless fear, guilt, self-oppression and isolation that LDS gays and lesbians can experience.”¶ The results of Affirmation’s May 2000 survey are astounding and sobering – fully 57 percent of the gay Mormon respondents admitted to thoughts of, or attempts, at suicide.¶ Affirmation.org is one small light in the darkness for queer members of the Mormon Church, offering them fellowship, support and understanding, encouraging spirituality, influencing Church leaders in their treatment and perception of homosexual church members, and providing gay and lesbian Mormons positive opportunities for social, intellectual, emotional and cultural development.¶ Yet with all the positive benefits Affirmation.org can provide those who seek them out, gay Mormons still struggle. They still contemplate, and commit, suicide in appalling numbers.¶ Queer Solidarity¶ Stuart Matis and DJ Thompson are just two of the many gay suicide victims tallied in this country each year, but they represent an important subset of the GBLT community that we cannot ignore or forget. Gay Mormons must be welcomed and encouraged to become part of the larger GBLT community, just as gay Muslims and gay Jews and gay agnostics are accepted.¶ To discriminate against them for their choice of religion is just as damning as discriminating against them for being queer, and as a group, the gay community simply cannot afford to alienate or discriminate against prospective members or supporters. ¶ The last words of Stuart Matis were written to his parents, but they contain wisdom the GBLT community should heed, as well:¶ “Seek to understand first before you make comments. We have the same needs as you. We desire to love and be loved. We desire to live our lives with happiness. We are not a threat to you or your families. We are your sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, neighbors, co-workers and friends, and most importantly, we are all children of God.”

Queer politics creates stereotypical image even when trying to be revolutionary – they replicate the white privilege of society.

Kirsch ‘1

Max H. Kirsch is Associate Professor at Florida Atlantic University Queer Theory and

Social Change. 2001 (74)

The popular literature on queer lifestyles is overwhelmingly directed at gay, white, primarily privileged males. That this should be so is not an enigma: it reflects the values of the larger society in which we all live, and it is no surprise that these values are reflected in the literature of queer popular culture. The mainstreaming of queer politics is proceeding assertively. We are becoming used to seeing images of “normal” gay couples, such as the stereotypes of gay lifestyles that are regularly displayed on TV sitcoms and melodramas. In centers of gay culture – in certain neighborhoods of major cities, but also in media production – “queer culture,” or at least gay male culture, is predominantly portrayed as either mired in muscle and decadence or as mirroring heterosexual relationships. Often one stereotypical image fades into another with the aging of those trying to achieve the ideals; there is no larger critique, no analysis of what is contributing to the commodification and consumption that continues, and no notion of whose interests it ultimately serves. Lifestyle becomes choice, and status is integrated into making the right choice.7 In cities and rural areas where coming out is still traumatic and dangerous, the norm is the mimicking of heterosexual relationships that becomes complete with a move to the suburbs. Much of the mainstream advertising and literature, queer and straight, is about owning the right things, whether it’s the right body, exciting sex, fashionable accessories, or children. Mass media, of course, promulgates the norms of the dominant culture and the economic machine that creates the desires of consumption. Consumer products encourage the achievement of identity through accessorized lifestyles. In a strange way the acquisition of consumables thus become symbolically equated with the achievement of rights. There is very little difference in the advertising directed toward the straight and the queer markets: whether we look at underwear ads created for gay men or pedophilic images of thin young women produced for the heterosexual market, their intention is the same – they are meant to sell products.8

#### Queer theory only reifies the systems of academia and society that they pretend to break down.

Halperin ‘3

David M. Halperin, PhD The Normalization of Queer Theory University of Michigan in Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the Discipline(s)edited by Gust A. Yep, Karen Lovaas, John P. Elia. 2003 (342)

But with the institutionalization of queer theory, and its acceptance by the academy (and by straight academics), have come new problems and new challenges. There is something odd, suspiciously odd, about the rapidity with which queer theory–whose claim to radical politics derived from its anti-assimilationist posture, from its shocking embrace of the abnormal and the marginal–has been embraced by, canonized by, and absorbed into our (largely heterosexual) institutions of knowledge, as lesbian and gay studies never were. Despite its implicit (and false) portrayal of lesbian and gay studies as liberal, assimilationist, and accommodating of the status quo, queer theory has proven to be much more congenial to established institutions of the liberal academy. The first step was for the “theory” in queer theory to prevail over the “queer,” for “queer” to become a harmless qualifier of “theory”: if it’s theory, progressive academics seem to have reasoned, then it’s merely an extension of what important people have already been doing all along. It can be folded back into the standard practice of literary and cultural studies, without impeding academic business as usual. The next step was to despecify the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or transgressive content of queerness, thereby abstracting “queer” and turning it into a generic badge of subversiveness, a more trendy version of “liberal”: if it’s queer, it’s politically oppositional, so everyone who claims to be progressive has a vested interest in owning a share of it. Finally, queer theory, being a theory instead of a discipline, posed no threat to the monopoly of the established disciplines: on the contrary, queer theory could be incorporated into each of them, and it could then be applied to topics in already established fields. Those working in English, history, classics, anthropology, sociology, or religion would now have the option of using queer theory, as they had previously used Deconstruction, to advance the practice of their disciplines–by “queering” them. The outcome of those three moves was to make queer theory a game the whole family could play. This has resulted in a paradoxical situation: as queer theory becomes more widely diffused throughout the disciplines, it becomes harder to figure out what’s so very queer about it, while lesbian and gay studies, which by contrast would seem to pertain only to lesbians and gay men, looks increasingly backward, identitarian, and outdated.

The academic part of queer theory isn’t very queer – we should focus more on everyday material queer examples and conditions.

Heinz ‘3

Bettina Heinz, PhD Bowling Green State University Sounds Queer to Me: The Politics of Disillusionment in Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the Discipline(s)edited by Gust A. Yep, Karen Lovaas, John P. Elia. 2003 (340-341)

The moment that the scandalous formula “queer theory” was uttered, however, it became the name of an already established school of theory, as if it constituted a set of specific doctrines, a singular, substantive perspective on the world, a particular theorization of human experience, equivalent in that respect to psychoanalytic or Marxist theory. The only problem was that no one knew what the theory was. And for the very good reason that no such theory existed. Those working in the field did their best, politely and tactfully, to point this out: Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, for example, published a cautionary editorial in PMLA entitled “What Does Queer Theory Teach Us About X?” But it was too late. Queer theory appeared on the shelves of bookstores and in advertisements for academic jobs, where it provided a merciful exemption from the irreducibly sexual descriptors “lesbian” and “gay.” It also harmonized very nicely with the contemporary critique of feminist and gay/lesbian identity politics, promoting the assumption that “queer” was some sort of advanced, postmodern identity, and that queer theory had superseded both feminism and lesbian/gay studies. Queer theory thereby achieved what lesbian and gay studies, despite its many scholarly and critical accomplishments, had been unable to bring about: namely, the entry of queer scholarship into the academy, the creation of jobs in queer studies, and the acquisition of academic respectability for queer work. Indeed, queer theory has been so successful in its dash to academic institutionalization that it has left tread marks all over earlier avatars of postmodern theory (who now even remembers The New Historicism?). As such, queer theory was simply too lucrative to give up. Queer theory, therefore, had to be invented after the fact, to supply the demand it had evoked. (The two texts that, in retrospect, were taken to have founded queer theory, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet and Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, were written well before anyone had ever heard of it.) All this would be merely amusing, if the hegemony of queer theory hadn’t had the undesirable and misleading effect of portraying all previous work in lesbian and gay studies as under-theorized, as laboring under the delusion of identity politics, and if it hadn’t radically narrowed the scope of queer studies by privileging its theoretical register, restricting its range, and scaling down its interdisciplinary ambition. Frankly, I see a lot more queerness at my local small-town America grocery store and fast-food chain, where local drag queens queer the workplace by working alongside straight, conservative, church-attending workers, or where gay, lesbian, and bisexual workers queer the workplace by coming out, innocuously, persistently, day after day, to customers and co-workers. These are the people who contribute to social and political change, not those academics who publish in queer theory and are still afraid to come out in the classroom. Surely, such a reproach does not do justice to those who do engage in the classroom as much as in their neighborhoods as in their scholarly productions, and, yes, the communication discipline can claim such scholars. But frankly, the climate, within communication studies as much as U.S. academe at large, is not one of community-grounded, action-oriented creation of queer scholarship, nor is it one of serious, free intellectual exchange. Most of us seem to be quite happy in complacency: we’re advancing, we’re teaching, we’re publishing, we’re being promoted–what more could we demand of ourselves, for heaven’s sake? Sometimes, performance of queer scholarship bears a faint resemblance to the emperor’s display of new clothes. We’re uncritical of the scholarship we engage in; we’re too easily satisfied with production of queer scholarship; we don’t push ourselves or our students to examine the consistency of our own everyday actions with the scholarship we pursue; we’re unlikely to link concrete political action with the scholarship we generate.

Queer theory is a hegemonic call – they will remain trapped in academia

Heinz ‘3

Bettina Heinz, PhD Bowling Green State University Sounds Queer to Me: The Politics of Disillusionment in Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the Discipline(s)edited by Gust A. Yep, Karen Lovaas, John P. Elia. 2003 (370)

This publication presents a chance to link disciplines, to create an interdisciplinary body of knowledge, and to offer communication scholarship to gay and lesbian and queer studies. At the same time, the directive to queer communication studies also constitutes a hegemonic call to order. Such a directive, however well intentioned, appears to be based on the premises that there is a communication studies (which is unqueer), that there is a body of “queer” scholarship that fulfills the anti-normative invocation of the label, and that “queering communication studies” is a laudable goal as such. These premises might be essentially agreeable, but they also specify the production of knowledge into a prescribed direction. Core questions remain. Who is going to read this scholarship? Or, perhaps more important, who is not going to read this scholarship? Non-academic individuals charged, by either governmental representation or appointment or by individual vocation, with actualizing queerness, such as health care professionals, social workers, court clerks, judges, attorneys, community activists, teachers, or clergy, are not likely to spend their rare leisure time perusing the latest academic queer theory outlets. What should we make of the fetish of citation, the unceasing deference paid to the en vogue gods and goddesses of queer theory? How should we engage with the competition among academics for the designated spot as as the queerest, or quarest, or sometimes fairest, of them all? It has become much too fashionable to be queer–as long as that queerness is nicely confined to a journal article, preferably in a special issue, or to a conference presentation. While U.S. academics continue to heavily traffic queer the- ories, some nations can actually point to real political progress–and academics had, arguably, little to do with it. Some queer theorists in the United States appear to engage in decidedly unqueer activities such as asserting gay or bisexual male hegemonies in academic caucuses, perpetuating a culture of whiteness and/or gender divisiveness, relentlessly pursuing academic advancement at the cost of speaking their supposedly critical minds, and mindlessly engaging in commodification of hard-core political issues. How queer is that?

#### Atoning for guilt the aff feels creates a never ending cycle, the more we pay it the more that remains to be paid, this cycle prevents us from finding meaning in our own lives

Zupancic, 2003 (Alenka, Philosopher, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzche’s philosophy of the two” Online, MB)

All this could be related to another important theme from the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche insists upon a generic difference between punishment and guilt. It is not that punishment gives rise to the feeling of guilt. Punishment can scare us, it can make us more cautious and cunning, and it can also make us masters of deception and hypocrisy—but it is not something that can, in itself, produce a bad or guilty conscience. There is something liberating (in relation to guilt) in the very idea of punishment as payment. According to Nietzsche, punishment originally presupposes measurability of injury and of enjoyment. In principle, I can repay (even if it is with nothing less than my life) the enjoyment I have stolen from the other (the damage or injury I have inflicted upon him). Punishment functions against the background of a possible equivalence between different deeds, even if this equivalence is quite arbitrarily set. On the other hand, guilt (the invention of guilt) is of a quite different origin: it arises not from the logic of (possible) equivalence and measurability, but from the logic of immeasurability. The presupposition of guilt is that enjoyment as such is not measurable (which could also mean that it is infinite or unattainable), that it has no equivalent. Accordingly, the debt opened up by “evil” deeds is not measurable either. The more we pay, the more remains to be paid. In this sense, the notions of guilt and surplus-enjoyment emerge together.Yet—and again—not in the sense that guilt refers to enjoyment, that enjoyment causes guilt, but, rather, in the sense that guilt is itself an articulation of enjoyment (just as the law can be the articulation of pure sensuality); it is a means by which the infinite can inscribe itself in the finite, or the beyond can inscribe itself in the body. Guilt is thus not a consequence of punishment. Rather than stemming from hard-hearted indifference, or even cruelty, it stems from love and sacrifice. This is, according to Nietzsche, “the stroke of genius on the part of Christianity”: “God himself sacrifices himself for the guilt of mankind, God himself makes payment to himself, God as the only being who can redeem man from what has become unredeemable for man himself—the creditor sacrifices himself for his debtor, out of love (can one credit that?), out of love for his debtor!—”22 God pays the debts of His debtors with His own pound of flesh. This solution is simultaneously both a stroke of genius and a sure path to catastrophe. It repays the debt (thus giving hope for a new start), but, simultaneously, it gives it an image that is precisely the image of the Infinite. And it is this payment of our debt that has the perverse effect of involving us in a new, eternal debt, bringing about the most terrible sickness of mankind: There resides a madness of the will which is absolutely unexampled: the will of man to find himself guilty and reprehensible to a degree that can never be atoned for; his will to think himself punished without any possibility of the punishment becoming equal to the guilt; his will to infect and poison the fundamental ground of things with the problem of punishment and guilt . . . ; his will to erect an ideal— that of the “holy God”—and in the face of it to feel the palpable certainty of his own absolute unworthiness. . . .Here is sickness, beyond any doubt, the most terrible sickness that has ever raged in man; and whoever can still bear to hear . . . how in this night of torment and absurdity there has resounded the cry of love, the cry of the most nostalgic rapture, of redemption through love, will turn away, seized by invincible horror.23

Queer theory creates dichotomies and fixes identities.

Heinz ‘3

Bettina Heinz, PhD Bowling Green State University Sounds Queer to Me: The Politics of Disillusionment in Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the Discipline(s)edited by Gust A. Yep, Karen Lovaas, John P. Elia. 2003 (372-373)

The harmless cuteness of contemporary queerness became clear in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks. For the most part, anti-essentialist, anti-identity, anti-establishment queer theory silently acquiesced into breaches of civil liberties, dodging a critique of flagrant nationalism and patriotism in the safe haven of abstract theoretical debate. This may be the result of a self-defeating circle of argumentation. Most current queer theory work dichotomizes, in its effort to de-dichotomize perceptions of realities, itself into existence. For queer to exist, unqueer has to preexist. The result is a queer theory as fixed as the identities, its proponents argue, do not exist. Recurrent immersions in traditional queer scholarship (Teresa de Lauretis, Judith Butler, Eve Sedgwick, David Gauntlett, and Michael Warner) led me to experience, again and again, the dialectic of being pulled toward the aesthetic appeal of unstable “identities” and an essentially anti-essentialist queerness on one hand and toward a frustrated insistence on applied theory and concrete socio-political outcomes on the other. Certainly, we need to acknowledge the contributions of queer theory: the integration of g/l/b/t topics into academic scholarship and disciplines; the potential to challenge traditional ways of thinking; the questioning of “stable” identity categories in our collective consciousnesses. But to survive, to be more than an academic fad, queer theory needs to engage in the self-reflexivity it indulges in so extensively when it comes to individual productions of scholarship. Rather than applauding its own performativity, it needs to be tested and measured in terms of its applicability to the dilemmas from which it arose. Its advocates need to rediscover the material realities of structural inequalities, realize the urgency to link concrete political action with outcomes of theoretical work, and recognize their accountability to the queer realities of everyday life.

#### By positing the ‘violent heterosexists’ as the enemy, the aff perpetually places themselves in the role of the victim which creates ressentiment

HIGGINS '06

 (Kathleen Marie, professor of philosophy at UT-Austin, CRITICAL AFFINITIES: NIETZSCHE AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN THOUGHT, p. 67 uw/mjs)

The great danger for any frustrated individual is the tendency to rage against the past that has treated one unfairly. Even when one's grievances are justified, the stance of angry victim is a disease, certainly not a cure for anything. In order to heal the wounds of the past (whether past ill treatment or guilt over one's own actions or inaction) one must resist the temptation to dwell on them. One compounds their damage if one takes them as evidence that one is pathetic and powerless. One can heal such inner wounds by learning to see oneself as having a will, with real power to affect change. One need not and in fact should not repress the fact that one's experiences have been what they were. But the aim is to recognize one's own will and dignity as having operated in these previous experiences, even if this was not what others chose to recognize. One needs to summon one's will to act, to make deliberate choices as to how to respond to the present situation, while recognizing the past as a source of insight, not just of affliction. To summarize Nietzsche's advice in a slogan, one must act, not react. As Zarathustra puts it, "All ‘it was’ is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident-until the creative will says to it, ‘But thus I willed it.’ Until the creative will says to it, ‘But thus I will it; thus shall I will it’" (Z: 2 "On Redemption"). Nietzsche offers support for African Americans afflicted by double consciousness through his accounts of his own experiences and the psychological processes they involved. He has written about the inner difficulties of proposing new values, particularly when these challenge the dominant views of one's contemporaries. He saw his own inner tension as a source of insight, if a painful one. Through his discussions of these matters, Nietzsche maintains spiritual solidarity with those, such as African Americans, whose political position may be different from his, but with whom he shares a divided consciousness. Like them, he seeks a resolution to inner conflict. To them, he suggests that this resolution may be accomplished by directing one's attention away from the past to the present moment and one's ability to assert one's will. One can move beyond the impasse of being unable to assent wholeheartedly to anything by summoning one's will to bequeath something of value to the future. Nietzsche leaves it to his readers to determine, for themselves, what this legacy might be.

#### Destabilizing the notion of gender doesn’t overthrow its ability to oppress

Raia Prokhovnik, Senior lecturer in politics at the Open University, UK, “Rational woman: a feminist critique of dichotomy “2002. p. 134

Walters’ conclusions are well-made. On the positive side she argues that ‘we should embrace [queer theory’s] recognition that much slips out of the rigid distinctions of hetero/homo, man/woman and that our theoretical and political engagements need to reckon creatively with the excess that dares not speak its name’. She also commends the ‘queer attempt to understand that sexuality and sexual desire is not reducible to gender’ (Walters 1996: 963). Nevertheless she is skeptical that destabilizing gender can ‘top the power of gender- a power that still sends too many women to the hospital, shelter, rape crisis center, despair’ (ibid.: 866). She observes, “we cannot afford to lose sight of the materiality of oppression and its operation in structural and institutional spaces’, and she suspects that queer theory fails to understand that ‘[d]estabilizing gender (or rendering its surface apparent) is not the same as overthrowing it’ (ibid.).

#### Queer theory erases Lesbians and transgendered people- green

Gust Yep, Karen Lovass, and John Elia, Prof @ San Fransico University, Journal of Homosexual Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2/3/4, 2003 p. 45

Gender Trouble. As a non-gender-specific term, “queer” appears inclusive of all genders. However, such terminological breaks can be read as reactionary and potentially dangerous (Thomas, 2000). Under a non-gender specific umbrella, Jeffreys (1997) is concerned about the disappearance of the lesbian and denial of lesbian oppression under patriarchy and heteronormativity. Similarly, Wolfe and Penelope (1993) contend that destabilization of identity categories, a typical move in queer analysis, leads to lesbian erasure. They write, We [cannot] afford to allow privileged patriarchal discourse (of which poststructuralism is but a new variant) to erase the collective identity Lesbians have only recently begun to establish. . . . For what has in fact resulted from the incorporation of deconstructive discourse, in academic “feminist” discourse at least, is that the word Lesbian has been placed in quotation marks, whether used or mentioned, and the existence of real Lesbians has been denied, once again. (p. 3) Given the history that “gay,” as a label, came to signify male homosexuality in a number of contexts, the concern that “queer” might become a male generic is certainly not unwarranted. Queer theory is also guilty of transgender erasure. Namaste (2000), for example, argues that queer theory, with its focus on performativity, fails to take into account the context in which gender performances occur. She points out that Butler’s drag queens perform in gay male cultural spaces and reduces drag to something a person does on stage rather than a person who is. In addition, queer theory ignores the material realities, the lived experiences and the subjectivities of transgendered people. Elliot and Roen (1998) call for the development and articulation of transgender theories, that is, ideas and assertions that inform and are informed by transgender political movements and articulated by transgenderists. Queer theory is committed to the deconstruction of gender and sexual categories. Engagement with the social context and the material realities associated with gender performance under heteropatriarchy would diminish the danger of excluding, erasing, and othering genders that are not male.

#### Ressentiment causes us to redistribute our hatred and guilt violently on others- t’s case

Barshack, 2003 (Lior, Radzyner school of law, “Nietzsche and legal theory (part two): Notes on the clerical body of the law” Lexis, MB)

These psychoanalytic insights are implicit in Nietzsche's portrayals of the priest's moral masochism. Nietzsche described clerical masochism as the struggle for survival of the weak under the most unfavorable of conditions through the assertion of a totally reversed notion of life. Ascetic practices and ideals respond to the need to institute permanent humiliation and submission as a feasible form of life in order to appease an internalized persecutor. [n64](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689399.1619410778&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219345406360&returnToKey=20_T4403572633&parent=docview#n64) Through the ascetic ideal, the clerical body  [\*1180]  disciplines and keeps intact its own unintegrated self, violently adapts itself to its disadvantaged condition, purifies itself by releasing its ressentiment in a reversed manner, while at the same time producing an idealized self-image and finally subordinating all human beings out of envy and revenge. [n65](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689399.1619410778&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219345406360&returnToKey=20_T4403572633&parent=docview#n65) In line with the psychoanalytic identification of fusion, death and the Sacred, Nietzsche sees the clerical body as an agent of death. [n66](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689399.1619410778&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219345406360&returnToKey=20_T4403572633&parent=docview#n66) In fact, it is to the corporate body as a whole, rather than death alone, that the clerical body is ordinarily consecrated. The clerical body enacts death in its capacity as the agent of the corporate body as a whole. With the sacred communal body, death is projected outside of the social and contained in the corporate body of the group. By being integrated into the human corporate order personified by the group's ancestors, death is tamed. [n67](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689399.1619410778&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219345406360&returnToKey=20_T4403572633&parent=docview#n67) Through projection, death is removed from the immediate social environment, integrated into a monistic, all-inclusive, life-asserting, human world-order and prevented from constituting an unmanageable external threat within a dualistic cosmos. [n68](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689399.1619410778&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219345406360&returnToKey=20_T4403572633&parent=docview#n68) Since ancestral figures and the corporate person of the group are immortal, they are invulnerable to death and can safely contain and control it. Moreover, they appropriate the power and authority of death and recruit them to the service of the human  [\*1181]  order. Authority, religious or political, rests on the fiction of having subordinated, incorporated and domesticated death. It must display its easy seizure and disposal of death. Through diverse representations of Power, the corporate order in its entirety emerges as invincible to death manipulating and utilizing it. The viability of political associations depends as much on their symbolic capacity to domesticate death as it does on their economic, military and administrative resources. The clerical body encapsulates the monistic corporate order within which death is contained, sublated and disarmed. [n69](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689399.1619410778&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219345406360&returnToKey=20_T4403572633&parent=docview#n69) Representing death in its culturally assimilated form, it plays a crucial role in humanity's effort to accommodate death and the Sacred. Through self-sacrifice, the clerical body bridges and reconciles the world of the living with the world of the dead and satisfies the demands of the latter. The administration of death, during its periodic pacifications and times of crisis, is handed over to the clerical body in the belief than it can integrate death, sometimes at the cost of its enactment, in a way that will secure the endurance of the life-asserting human-corporate order. As Nietzsche saw, the clergy, while instituting the negative, makes life possible. [n70](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689399.1619410778&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219345406360&returnToKey=20_T4403572633&parent=docview#n70) In the name of civilization and for its sake, the modern clerical body exercises the highest authority within the corporate order: jurisdiction as power over the life and death of the subject. [n71](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689399.1619410778&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219345406360&returnToKey=20_T4403572633&parent=docview#n71)

#### And, their imagination of a better world is a continuation of the ascetic ideal. This association of all that is good at not of this world expresses a hatred for the only one we’ve got—turns case. Fantasizing about a world without suffering produces creative impotence only our relationship to life can escape this paradox of resentment

Turlani in 2003

(Aydan, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of Letters and Sciences
Istanbul Technical University, “Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 26 (2003), 55-63)

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (*WP* III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. **[End Page 61]** Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants *to escape from torture*" (*GM* III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of *this* world'" (*GM* III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (*WP* III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (*WP* III 586). The way out of the circle created by the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (*PI* §309).

#### Ressentiment is what justified the atrocitiy of lynchings- the aff creates a violent methodology that decides who needs saving and who needs destroying- reifies power hierarchies and t’s case

PITTMAN '06 (John, instructor in philosophy and the humanities at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CRITICAL AFFINITIES: NIETZSCHE AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN THOUGHT, p.40-1 uw/mjs)

One of the things about the record of third-period lynchings noted almost universally is the enacted fury and the extreme cruelty displayed in these violent rituals. Indeed, "displays" is very much an apt word: lynchings came to be almost communal ceremonies of catharsis, as it were, of pent-up impulses of brutality. The severity of cruelty displayed in lynchings suggests that those involved in the "lynch mob" were animated by complexes of feeling and impulse that were latent and dynamic. This dynamic of cruelty in lynchings makes sense viewed in terms of the ideas of ressentiment and its relation to cruelty and violence, for the effect of ressentiment's release in a directly physical or nonsublimated form would be to sweep before it all of the impulses of cruelty that have collected and intensified in the subject. The lynch "mob," organized as it was around the prospect of "punishing" a violator of some community standard-and I shall return momentarily to the issues of punishment and of the nature of those alleged violations-was fundamentally animated by the prospect of witnessing and participating in the expected enactments of cruelty Numerous accounts testify to the avidness with which spectators, given the chance, became participants, to the relish with which body parts were sought and collected as if prizes, to the feasts of mutilation and burning in which so many were so anxious to witness and participate. The lynching ritual, far removed from its original in the form of a rushed execution, became increasingly encrusted with more extensive and varied forms of atrocity perpetrated against the person and, after death, to the body of the victim. The grisly prologue to death became the main act, the payoff, for the participants as for the spectators. The very fact that the lynching ceremonies were the work of a mob, a group composing itself for that express purpose, rather than the act of isolated individuals, also seems to support the suggestion that ressentiment was a decisive force in carrying out the atrocity. Nietzsche consistently associates ressentiment with what he calls the "herd instinct." Those who are weak-willed must need the solidarity of numbers to give expression to their cruel urges: only in the midst of the mob, where participation is encouraged, do these urges give rise to act. But if the lynch mob is constituted in some sense, and in part, by these powerful reactive feelings, then what is the original stimulus and object of these feelings? What are the reactive feelings a reaction to? The Nietzschean account of ressentitnent points to the deep-etched impact of humiliations sustained by the powerless at the hands of the powerful. My suggestion here is that we are dealing with the trace of class and power relations manifested in the lives of poor, disenfranchised Southern whites, these lowest social orders of Southern white society that provided the vast bulk of the members of lynch mobs. This is not to say that the social and political elite of the white South never participated in lynchings and never were spectators either. But the general pattern was for middle- and upper-class whites to condone lynchings or to "turn a blind eye" to them without actively participating, while the overwhelming participation and spectatorship came from among the lowest classes. Given this, we can surmise that the reactive feelings that fueled the lynchings were, at least in part, feelings and impulses within the poor whites rooted in their own oppression and poverty, feelings originally or logically directed against the ruling elite of wealthy whites who dominated southern society. That is to say, these feelings were in large degree, even in their bulk, class feelings that could not safely be directed against their proper objects-that is, the powerful and wealthy white plantocracy.